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By Richard J. Sullivan and Zhu Wang
F
rom the early days of automated card sorting to the more recent
times of the Internet and check imaging, payments and payments
processing have continually embraced new technology. At the
same time, the industry has been shaped by its share of entry and exit,
through startups, mergers, and the reorganization of businesses seeking
the proper scope of horizontal and vertical integration. Many of these
changes have introduced new risks to payments. In response, public
policy has evolved to help manage these risks. 
These changes have enabled nonbank organizations to play a larger
role in the payments system. Nonbanks have followed a number of
pathways to more prominence: purchasing bank payment processing
subsidiaries, carving out niches in the payments market through innova-
tion, and taking advantage of economies of scale made possible by
shifting to electronic forms of payment. 
The contributions of nonbanks are undeniable. They have intro-
duced some of the most far-reaching innovations to the payments system
in recent years, leading to greater efficiencies in payments processing. At
the same time, nonbanks have changed the dynamics of competition in
payments, leading to a significant change in the system’s risk profile. 
Richard J. Sullivan and Zhu Wang are senior economists at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. This article is on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
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The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City sponsored a conference
on nonbanks in the payments system in Santa Fe, New Mexico., on
May 2-4, 2007. The conference addressed many of the key questions
raised by the growing presence of nonbanks in payments. Have recent
payments innovations been more likely to come from nonbanks? Have
nonbanks improved or harmed competition in payments? Have non-
banks increased risk or helped to develop tools to manage it? How
should public policy respond as increasingly more activity in payments
lies outside of the banking system? 
Policymakers, industry practitioners, and academics from around the
world attended the conference to exchange views on these challenging
questions. This article summarizes the contributions of conference presen-
ters and recaps the extensive discussions that followed their presentations. 
I. NONBANKS IN THE EUROPEAN AND U.S.
PAYMENTS SYSTEMS
The conference began with the presentation of a study jointly
undertaken by staff at the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Employing a common set of defi-
nitions and a uniform analytical framework, this study documents the
various activities performed by nonbanks in the European Union (EU)
and U.S. retail payments systems. It also assesses the implications of the
growing role of nonbanks for central bank oversight. 
The study defines a nonbank payment service provider as any enter-
prise that is not a bank and provides payment services to its customers,
primarily by way of electronic means. Nowadays, nonbanks perform func-
tions for various payment types, such as credit cards, debit cards,
electronic checks, credit and debit transfers, e-money, and stored-value
transactions. Nonbanks also conduct payment activities, such as hardware
and software provision, consumer and merchant interaction, backroom
processing, clearing and settlement, and post-transaction accounting.
To assess the role of nonbanks in retail payments, two original
surveys were conducted. The EU survey was carried out among pay-
ments experts of the national central banks of 13 countries—eight from
the Euro area (Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and Slovenia) and five from non-Euro member states (Bulgaria, Cyprus,
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Czech Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania). Meanwhile, a similar U.S. survey
was completed by the Payments System Research staff at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The results of the surveys show that
nonbank presence in retail payments systems is substantial and growing
on both continents. In particular, nonbanks are most prominent in the
United States, dominating a large number of payments activities for a
large number of payment types. In Europe, nonbanks are very important
for card payments and, in certain countries (Germany and Italy), other
payment types as well. For other payment types, however, the role of non-
banks in Europe is more limited but growing rapidly. 
The study also compares the regulatory frameworks in the European
Union and United States regarding nonbank payment service providers.
While there are many similarities, some differences also emerge. First,
the ECB has clear regulatory authority over payments, while the Federal
Reserve’s authority is more limited. Second, supervision of nonbank
payment processors is less uniform across the various countries of the
European Union than across the U.S. states. However, it is expected the
proposed Payments Services Directive (PSD) should bring more
harmony to the treatment of both bank and nonbank payment proces-
sors in the European Union. Third, in the European Union, a legislative
initiative is under way to allow the provision of payment services to end
users by a new category of nonbank payment institutions, while the
United States has nothing equivalent.
With the above said, central banks in both the European Union and
United States face the same challenges: to catch up with the rapid
changes in payments and to continue ensuring the safety and efficiency
of the system. In particular, the rising importance of nonbanks and the
multiple roles they play in the payments chain have changed traditional
risk setting. Thus, a critical question is whether the current scope of
oversight by central banks remains sufficient. Accordingly, the paper
addresses two important policy issues. First, is there a need for updating
the legal basis for central bank oversight on nonbanks? And second, is
there a need for coordination among various authorities with different
competencies that affect nonbank payment service providers?
During the open discussion period, presenters Simonetta Rosati and
Stuart E. Weiner led a conversation with the audience about various
issues surrounding the increasing presence of nonbanks in payments.
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First, what are the implications of telecommunication companies’
(telco) entrance into the payments arena? The presenters agreed that
mobile payment is a major movement in both Europe and the United
States. They pointed out that the recently proposed PSD explicitly
addresses this issue in the European Union, where telecommunication
companies would be able to set up payment institutions to provide
payment services. The United States has not taken similar actions. 
Second, what is the role of industry self-regulation in the payments
area? Rosati commented that industry self-regulatory efforts supported
by public authorities could be very effective. The ongoing Single Euro-
pean Payments Area (SEPA) project in Europe is a clear example.
Weiner agreed and pointed out there are similar initiatives in the United
States. He commented that a market solution is generally preferred to a
regulatory solution, and that there are benefits to private-sector efforts
to come to common standards and practices in payments. 
Third, in Europe, are the limitations on nonbanks acquiring bank
charters like those in the United States? The presenters said yes, although
there are between- and within-country differences. As an example, they
pointed out France, where the national legal system restricts payment
instruments activity to banks only. However, when the PSD is imple-
mented, nonbank payment institutions will be allowed to provide
payment services, and the same set of rules will apply across all Europe. 
II. NONBANKS AND PAYMENTS INNOVATION
In the second session, Bronwyn Hall reviewed the economics of inno-
vation with a special application to payments. Electronic payments are a
form of disruptive technology that has the potential to make cash and
checks obsolete, thus changing the structure of the payments industry.
Like other industries affected by disruptive technologies, many recent
innovators and entrants to the payments industry are outsiders. In the case
of payments, many of these outsiders are nonbank organizations. Research
on innovation has shown that established firms tend to be better at incre-
mental innovations, while radical innovations typically come from
outsiders. These tendencies also appear to be true for payments. 
Computers and network technology are from a class of what has
been called “general purpose technology”—useful for many purposes
but requiring significant research and development and co-invention for
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specific applications. In the case of electronic payments, technical devel-
opment requires standards for interoperability, development of new
labor skills, and complementary investments. With this ancillary devel-
opment, full diffusion of new applications of general purpose
technology can take substantial amounts of time. 
Hall’s preliminary analysis of patent data reveals a number of char-
acteristics about payments innovation. Few payment-related patents in
the United States come directly from the commercial banking sector. In
contrast, in Europe, more than half of payment-related patents are
issued to banks or near banks. Patterns of U.S. patenting suggest that a
wide range of firms innovate in payments—credit card issuers, transac-
tions processors, security and identification services, and so on. This is
true perhaps because of the early penetration of credit cards. Despite the
perception of recent rapid change, innovation in payments is not
unduly heavy in relation to the size of the industry. 
In his comments on Hall’s paper, Lee Manfred noted that, in his
experience, there have been many examples of both evolutionary and
radical payments innovations coming from both banks and nonbanks.
Innovation has been largely tied to the availability of cheap and reliable
telecommunication. Manfred evaluated payments innovations from a
business perspective. Does it give the consumer a good experience? Does
it solve a problem and have a sustainable competitive advantage? Does
the company have the capability and backing to make the innovation
work? Successful payments innovations today—such as E-ZPass—are
good business propositions but often serve niche markets. The issues of
network economics described by Hall can make it very difficult for a
payments innovation to be widely adopted. 
Panelist Benjamin Ling described Google’s fundamental business as
matching consumers and advertisers. He argued that the business works
better if the flow of consumers to its site can be increased. Google
Checkout makes checkout easier in an effort to increase completed
transactions between consumers and merchants. For consumers, Google
Checkout streamlines online purchases, minimizes the number of
online accounts, and helps protect personal data. For merchants, it gen-
erates more leads, increases conversion rates, and reduces costs. Because
e-commerce is still in its early phase, there is a lot of room for growth. 
Next, René Pelegero said that a key benefit of the Internet is that it
allows transactions between buyers and sellers who do not know one
another. One of PayPal’s main innovations has instilled more trust in
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online transactions by allowing customers to make payments without
sharing bank account information. Other important innovations
include rapid access to funds, ease in establishing a PayPal account, and
a convenient transaction process. PayPal has been a leader in security
and risk management with its recent efforts to combat phishing and
website spoofing. Pelegero does not view these innovations as radical,
but rather incremental improvements to existing systems. Finally, while
PayPal is a nonbank, it is under some supervisory authority and must
comply with many banking regulations. 
Panelist Margaret Weichert began by observing that the view of pay-
ments has changed over the years. In earlier days, the system was
considered “costly plumbing” that served other lines of business,
whereas today it is seen as a critical part of the value that banks give cus-
tomers and the economy. Innovation in payments must accommodate a
complex and fragmented infrastructure. Because many players have a
stake in payments, innovation tends to be incremental and slow, but it
can be successful if it solves problems, makes improvements, or provides
some value for all participants who support the payments system. Non-
banks have some unique advantages that enable them to take part in
payments innovation. They are often small, privately held, and less con-
strained by expectations of stockholders and securities markets. Such
advantages may make it easier for nonbanks to introduce more disrup-
tive technology. 
Most of the discussion following the formal remarks centered on
two themes. First, what is the role of regulation? Some saw it as inhibit-
ing innovation, as evidenced by spates of change following deregulation,
as in the airline industry. Others saw it spurring innovation, perhaps to
bypass regulatory constraints. Regulation can protect consumers, but it
is sometimes troublesome if overly broad and applied in areas where it is
not really needed. Technology can also undermine original justifications
for regulation, such as the separation of banking and commerce. Some
payments technology is now intimately related to particular systems of
commerce, such as the relation between PayPal and eBay. Thus, an
important question arises: Does this pose an issue if a bank tries to make
inroads in this area? 
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Second, what is the fundamental business structure for recent pay-
ments innovations? One commentater asked whether PayPal or Google
Checkout were competitors or partners for other payment providers.
Another wondered why banks offered new payment services for a posi-
tive price when they fundamentally reduced bank costs. Some expressed
concern that a bank’s desire to offer banking services to traditionally
underserved markets could be tempered by negative public perceptions
of these services. 
III. PAYMENTS MODERNIZATION IN EUROPE
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, a member of the Executive Board of the
ECB, gave the luncheon speech. Her speech, “Modernizing Payments:
No Pain, No Gain,” was motivated by the vision that payments mod-
ernization is a process of “creative destruction.” In this process,
well-established products and players are constantly destroyed and
replaced by newer and better ones. In particular, nonbanks and cross-
border competition are putting increasing pressure on existing service
structures and processes. 
The speech focused on three issues. First, what drives payments
innovation, particularly in Europe? The payments industry around the
world is experiencing rapid change. The key forces of this change are
political and regulatory initiatives, international competition, innova-
tions in payment services, and the progress in information technology.
In Europe, the most notable example is the market-driven initiative to
establish SEPA, which seeks to provide common technical and commer-
cial standards for the payments industry. SEPA will be underpinned by
a new legal framework in the form of the PSD. By harmonizing the
national legal frameworks, the directive will facilitate SEPA’s implemen-
tation and allow more nonbank players to enter the payments arena.
The increased competition, along with changes in technology and regu-
lation, is expected to fuel payments innovations, giving major benefits
to the wider economy.
Second, how will nonbanks influence payments modernization? As
far as cashless payments are concerned, nonbanks have been very active
along the whole payments processing chain. They have successfully
tapped profitable niche markets—for example, by identifying customer
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needs that are not sufficiently met by traditional payment instruments.
The competition brought by new nonbank players may cause pain to
existing banks and nonbanks in the payments area. Nevertheless, central
banks should support innovation and competition in the payments
system from both banks and nonbanks when these factors improve
market efficiencies and benefit the user community.
Third, what are the possible risks and the role of central banks?
Here, the main issue is to ensure a level playing field for all payments
market participants, banks and nonbanks. To achieve that, the central
banks and regulators need to analyze the risks posed by diversified
players and reflect on adequate policy responses. They also need to
develop risk mitigation standards to ensure all players are treated equally
with regard to the risks they undertake. And they should recognize that
the protection of personal data is expected at all levels of processing so as
not to compromise public confidence in the payments system.
Tumpel-Gugerell concluded that the modernization process is
worth the pain and effort because it will benefit the payments industry
and society as a whole. She therefore encouraged the payments industry
to take up the challenges and lead the process toward more modern and
innovative payments systems. 
During the open discussion, the audience asked questions about
SEPA and the PSD. One question concerned how the SEPA initiative
will affect network competition as national payments systems in Europe
move to the single European payment area. Tumpel-Gugerell responded
that SEPA will open national payment network arrangements, which
should help create better conditions for competition. Meanwhile, con-
solidation is the focus at this moment because of the potential for cost
reduction, though competition remains a parallel issue. Another ques-
tioner asked how the PSD will affect consumer rights, given that it
entitles the bank to specify its own dispute resolution procedure.
Tumpel-Gugerell responded that the harmonized consumer protection
framework would be the best solution, but this was not possible, and it
is too complex to go into legal harmonization. The PSD is a beginning
step and will be a sufficient framework for the time being. 
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IV. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION 
IN PAYMENTS
The third session started with a paper by Nicholas Economides on
“Nonbanks in the Payments System: Vertical Integration Issues.”
Economides discussed the incentives for vertical expansion and vertical
mergers in the payments industry, paying particular attention to the
implications of the existence of network effects in this industry. 
Merchants and payments systems provide complementary compo-
nents for transactions. Given such a relation, the split of surplus created
by transactions depends on the relative market power between mer-
chants and payments system, and, in turn, depends on the extent of
competition between payments systems. 
Merchants may choose to extend vertically into payments systems,
and their incentives depend on the concentration in the payments
market. A merchant will see a vertical extension or merger as more prof-
itable if it can bypass payments firms with significant market power.
Entering this market would most likely lead to a reduction in payments
systems fees, even if the majority of transactions occur through the
network not owned by the merchants. A recent example is Wal-Mart’s
attempt to open an industrial loan bank to provide payment services.
Payments systems have strong network effects and tend to create
extreme market shares, prices, and profit inequality. This inequality does
not necessarily result from anticompetitive actions. At the same time,
customers and merchants can use or accept a number of competing
payment instruments. This “two-sided multihoming” may mitigate the
effects of incompatibility among payment networks. However, the lack
of flexibility by payments systems in setting fees for merchants reduces
competition among these networks and creates incentives for merchants
to extend vertically into payments systems. 
Following the paper, panelists presented their views on vertical inte-
gration in payments. Michael Cook reviewed Wal-Mart’s attempts to
open an industrial loan bank in the United States, efforts which have
been unsuccessful since 1999. The incentive for Wal-Mart to enter the
payments space is to bypass the market power of credit card networks.
He argued that the payment network does not operate on a level playing
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field because merchants are not allowed to collectively negotiate against
the card associations, who collectively set merchant fees on behalf of
member banks.
Trey Jinks gave a processor’s perspective on vertical integration. TSYS
is a payment processing firm with extensive international presence. TSYS
focuses its business on acquiring and issuing processing. It concentrates
on its core business and does not intend to be vertically integrated
because the firm is concerned that vertical integration may limit its
product innovation and lead to a zero-sum competition with its cus-
tomers. Thus, TSYS prefers to remain an independent service provider
and allow its clients to compete with each other.
Pamela Joseph commented on vertical integration from a major
bank’s perspective. Taking the historical evolution of online debit, gift
cards, and fleet cards as examples, Joseph pointed out that while many
payment products were initially developed in merchant environments or
by corporations, they eventually migrated out and ended up being
owned and operated by payment processors or banks. Therefore, the
vertical integration of payments is a process that disintegrates payments
from merchants and integrates them with banks and payment proces-
sors. A recent example of this can be found in the payment services for
health care.
During the open discussion, many questions centered on market
power and pricing issues in the payment card industry. First, merchants
are typically charged different service prices by card networks according
to their size. How would this affect market efficiency and welfare? The
panelists commented that, excluding extreme cases in which there is a
tremendous amount of market power by the network or the firm that
offers these discounts, offering discounts is generally a good thing. In
particular, by offering discounts, the payments industry can internalize
user network externalities and perform more efficiently.
Second, merchants are allowed to surcharge their customers for card
payments in some countries. How would this affect market competition
and welfare? The panelists commented that surcharges will increase the
sensitivity of consumers using one card versus another. Such a choice is
likely to increase competition among the various card networks. In the
Netherlands, surcharging has been available for a long time, but surpris-
ingly few merchants use it. One explanation is that surcharges may have
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given merchants more edge or effectiveness in negotiating fees, although
they are not seen at equilibrium. In the United States, merchants are not
allowed to surcharge, and cash discounts appear to be practically impos-
sible for merchants. In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia forced
the card schemes to remove their no-surcharge rules in 2003. As a result,
merchants have more bargaining power against card schemes, and they
successfully negotiated lower interchange fees for scheme debit cards.
Since the no-surcharge rule was removed, the percentage of merchants
surcharging has continued to rise. 
The fourth session started with a paper by Professor Jean-Charles
Rochet on “Some Economics of Horizontal Integration in the Payments
Industry.” Rochet reviewed the general principles of horizontal integra-
tion in traditional economic analysis and argued that the analysis must
be amended to take care of the special network effect in the two-sided
payments industry.
In a traditional industry, when firms compete on prices, competi-
tion drives prices down to the marginal cost, thus leading to a situation
that maximizes social welfare. By contrast, if these firms merge and form
a monopoly, the price will increase to the monopoly price and depress
social welfare. Consequently, mergers in traditional industries tend to
harm social welfare unless they generate significant technological syner-
gies. However, in a network industry, this fundamental result may not
hold. This result is likely due to a network externality: Consumers get a
higher utility from a bigger network, and thus a greater scale of opera-
tion generates a higher economic surplus. Network externalities are
similar to increasing returns to scale.
For these reasons, horizontal mergers may have a totally different
impact in a network industry than in a traditional industry: Mergers can
simultaneously benefit firms and consumers. In a two-sided network
like the payment card industry, the analysis of horizontal mergers is
more complex because the structure of prices across the two sides of the
market also matters. It is true that some tools of classical antitrust analy-
sis can be adapted by looking at the total volume and the total price of
card transactions. But the relation between these measures of market
power and social welfare is far from clear. The development of nonbank
control over payment networks may be problematic in terms of risks,
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but as far as competition policy is concerned, the only things that matter
are the governance structure of the different networks, their access crite-
ria, and pricing rules.
Panelists discussed various issues of horizontal integration in the
context of SEPA. Ken Howes agreed that the SEPA initiative will signifi-
cantly change the European payments landscape and create a favorable
climate for nonbanks’ entrance. However, he raised the concern that con-
solidation and commoditization of payments might have a potentially
negative impact, leading to less competition, less investment in payments,
and even the withdrawal of traditional banks involved in payments.
B.J. Haasdijk commented on SEPA from the point of view of a
payment processor. Equens was created to form a pan-European full-
service payment processor by merging two payment processing firms,
Interpay in the Netherlands and Transaktionsinstitut in Germany. This
merger was motivated primarily to meet the challenge of the SEPA ini-
tiative. Through horizontal integration, the firm is able to exploit large
economies of scale as well as the first-mover advantage, which is
expected to ensure the firm’s competitiveness in the single European
payments area.
Gerard Hartsink pointed out that the SEPA initiative is one of the
steps to create a more efficient financial sector in Europe and is not
limited to payments. The job of the European Payments Council in car-
rying out the SEPA initiative is to set the unified business rules and
standards across EU countries. This will certainly change the payments
industry structure and competitive environment and will have a huge
impact on customers—in particular, corporations, public administra-
tions, banks, card schemes, and service providers. 
David Yates talked about his understanding of SEPA. In his mind,
SEPA is the political will to create a united Europe from a payments
point of view. The single European payments area is already a reality for
physical cash but not for electronic payments systems. He expects the
SEPA initiative to achieve a more unified and competitive European
payments landscape by fueling cross-border horizontal integration,
introducing the new “payments institutions,” and changing the business
governance model for card schemes.
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During the open discussion, the audience asked various questions
about how SEPA will affect the payments industry evolution in Europe.
First, how would the separation of processing and scheme work for
payment cards? The panelists responded that separation would give any
individual bank or merchant acquirer the opportunity to take the pro-
cessing business, regardless of associated card schemes, to whichever
processor they choose—without a cross-subsidy from a scheme to that
processing business. 
Second, as the payments industry in Europe continues to consoli-
date, how will the cost-revenue model evolve? The panelists thought it
would be more difficult for banks to generate revenues from the retail
payments business as competition intensifies. Banks may have to turn
toward credit as a tool for generating additional profit. For nonbanks,
the business models can look very different from those for banks
because some of the traditional revenue streams that banks use to cross-
subsidize other aspects of their value proposition are unnecessary in the
nonbank environment. 
Third, how will consolidation affect the competitiveness of the
European payments markets? The panelists predicted that only a small
number of players would survive consolidation. However, this will not
necessarily harm competition because the surviving firms will be much
more cost-efficient given their large scales. In addition, they will still face
intense competition from each other. This, in fact, has been seen in the
United States on both the automated clearinghouse (ACH) and clear-
inghouse sides.
V. RISK IMPLICATIONS OF NONBANKS IN PAYMENTS
In the conference’s fifth session, Ross Anderson argued that the man-
agement of information security risks must involve technological
solutions. But economic policy is also important to help direct incentives
ensure that participants properly manage risks. Online crime has acceler-
ated recently, especially phishing, which has been facilitated by an online
underground market for services to commit fraud. Technological counter-
measures in the form of front-end authentication systems have progressed
but are hampered by incorrect incentives, inadequate security protocols,
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and improving methods of attack. Back-end controls are therefore vital.
Financial institutions should take steps to limit exposure, detect fraud,
slow transaction velocity, and recover funds obtained illegally. 
The critical question, then, is, What will be the payments system’s
response to novel threats? In response to a flood of phishing attacks, for
example, some UK banks have created asset recovery systems on a
virtual production-line basis. Adaptation is critical because fraud moves
to areas of weakness, and money laundering mechanisms shift toward
payment services with easy transfers, irrevocable payments, and effective
methods to move funds into unregistered forms of assets. Some
nonbank payment services have become the means by which illegal
funds are transferred, in large part because they feature irrevocable pay-
ments. However, the net benefits of nonbank financial service providers
have been positive, including traditional payment providers such as
hawalas, because they bring to the market added competition, favorable
pricing, and innovation. 
Revocable payments are a key tool in the fight against payments
fraud. Once fraud is reported, the bank should be able to track the trans-
action and recover the funds quickly. While some may see irrevocability
as an important feature of payments systems, Anderson pointed out that
banks have historically offered a mix of revocable and guaranteed (irrevo-
cable) payments. Indeed, an explicit market for guaranteed, large-value
payments helps ensure that risk management practices are applied. Revo-
cable payments could be limited, for example, to smaller-value payments
that are unattractive to laundering the proceeds of fraud. 
Anderson concluded that, without proper incentives, asset recovery
efforts could be undermined. Incentives to control risk are often deter-
mined by the liability structure in place when things go wrong. If
consumers bear the loss when an unauthorized payment hits their
account, then financial institutions have little incentive to recover funds.
In the United States, Regulation E limits consumer liability in the case
of payments fraud. At the same time, the regulation provides an incen-
tive to financial institutions to ensure that fraud is kept out of payments,
and it limits the benefit criminals would obtain from fraud through
asset recovery operations. 
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Avivah Litan began her comments by describing two recent changes
in how criminals obtain payment data. First, they are now more likely to
attack merchant point-of-sale systems. These systems tend to be easy
targets because security was less of an issue when the systems were
installed and because merchants generally lack expertise in information
security. Second, criminals are more likely to attack consumers directly
through phishing e-mails with bogus offers for lotteries, gifts, or pre-
scription drugs, and through malware that can spy on user activities or
take over personal computers. 
Litan argued that regulators need to help devise solutions to prob-
lems of fraud. Because consumers appear to be having a harder time
recovering stolen funds, consumer protections should be strengthened.
Regulators also need to improve incentives by aligning liability with
controlling risk. There is a disturbing tendency for some payments par-
ticipants to dump liability on others, especially on retailers. While
retailers need to do their part, often others in the payments system are in
a better position to control risk. 
According to panelist Jean Bruesewitz, Visa’s model of security
assumes that attackers will exploit weaknesses. As a consequence, Visa
uses a layered security model that continually improves methods at all
points of the transaction cycle. The company uses an account-by-
account, transaction-based fraud detection system. All of Visa’s credit,
debit, and ATM transactions are gathered in a central system that pro-
vides issuers with real-time, broad-based authorization and fraud
detection. Account takeover is a challenge, and Visa is studying methods
to detect legitimate versus fraudulent use of accounts. They are also
looking at ways to effectively manage data breaches and to control
movement of funds. 
Panelist Roy DeCicco agreed with Anderson: Asset recovery is
important to the payments industry, but equally important is fraud mit-
igation at the front end of the payment cycle. As an example of how
innovation presents security challenges, he cited the new ability of mer-
chants to convert checks to ACH payments. One result is that
merchants will possess thousands of checks as well as associated elec-
tronic records, all of which must be properly safeguarded. DeCicco also
pointed to industry efforts to manage payments security. The BITS
Partner Group recently studied cross-channel payments risk and issued
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recommendations to promote sharing fraud data, closing liability gaps,
and developing standards for third-party access to payments. The
National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) has done a
good job securing the ACH system but has also moved forward with a
comprehensive risk management strategy. 
Richard Oliver addressed issues important to ACH security, the role
of regulation, and nonbanks in payments. He said aggressive follow-up
to fraud in ACH is hampered by transaction records that lack identifica-
tion of payment originators. NACHA is implementing changes—for
example, to help expedite responses to problems. It is also reforming its
system of fines because, according to Oliver, “if you want people to pay
attention, raise the price of violations.” Regulator responses to ACH risk
have helped, but the integration of responses to payment problems has
not been sufficient. A comprehensive, cross-channel, cross-regulator,
cross-industry approach to regulation is needed. A cross-network data-
base of bad players would help. Finally, many nonbank players pose
little risk. Trouble is more likely to come from nonbank payment
providers, who approach potential bank partners and ask for a signifi-
cant degree of control in processing payments. 
The final panelist, James Van Dyke, worried that misperceptions
about identity fraud are hampering efforts to combat the problem. Most
people believe that fraud mainly occurs because of data breaches and
Internet use. But evidence shows that at least half of identity fraud origi-
nates with data obtained elsewhere. Some believe fraud prevention is the
most effective tool for solving the problem, but Van Dyke’s research points
to resolution as more effective. Many are surprised to learn that most
identity fraud is carried out by those close to the victim and that younger
people are the most likely targets. The public generally believes that iden-
tity fraud is getting worse, but studies show it is actually declining. People
also are mistaken to think that use of electronic channels raises an individ-
ual’s vulnerability, when the opposite is true. Van Dyke strongly proposed
empowering consumers to use online channels to monitor their accounts
and control their risk exposure. A consistent fact is that half of identity
theft incidents are first detected by account holders. 
In the discussion period, one commentator lamented that publicity
about data breaches seems harmless to those responsible, both in terms
of devaluation of stock prices and lost customers. Panelists responded
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that it is hard for consumers to get consistent information about com-
pliance with data security standards. While research has shown a
disconnect between expressed consumer sentiment on privacy and their
actual behavior, it has also shown that consumers respond strongly if a
second data breach closely follows the first. 
One questioner asked if it might be too easy to open an account,
drawing several responses. To protect against forged documents and
make decisions based on more information, it may be better to shift
from document-based verification to an identity score. An industrywide
identity database would help accomplish this. It would also be useful to
hold credit reporting agencies responsible for disseminating incorrect
information about consumers. 
Audience questions again generated discussion about the role of reg-
ulation. Banks are unlikely to get improved security from some elements
of the information technology sector because the financial applications
market is too small to justify the expense of specialized software. It is
important to consider both industry and government regulation and use
them where they are most effective. 
VI. CENTRAL BANK POLICY
The final session focused on central bank policy toward payments.
Philip Klopper began by explaining the oversight approach over pay-
ments at the Dutch central bank. He observed that care must be taken
in payments oversight. Autonomous technological change has driven
recent changes in payments. New technology has allowed payments
services to be unbundled, which, in turn, has made it easier for non-
banks to enter the industry. Regulators should resist attempts to stop or
alter autonomous development—or risk harming society and reducing
the competitive position of their jurisdiction. 
The Dutch approach to payments oversight is scheme-oriented. A
payment scheme consists of scheme owners, issuers, acquirers, networks,
and so on—players whose activities add up to a payment product. They
use principles-based oversight rather than rules-based regulation. Princi-
ples-based oversight is better for payments because it can adapt to future
development, maintain adequate oversight of new players, and level the
playing field for banks and nonbanks. 
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This philosophy of oversight places great weight on self-assessments of
the scheme owner, who sets a structure of licenses, rules, and regulations.
The scheme owner then uses the licensing process and its role as a
monitor to control risk. An important advantage is that the scheme owner
can make quick assessments of payments innovations and make appropri-
ate adjustments. The central bank assesses the adequacy of the scheme’s
structure and steps in only if the scheme owner is not doing its job. 
Philip Lowe first noted that the Reserve Bank of Australia has
explicit legislative authority over the stability, as well as the competition
and efficiency, of the payments system. His remarks focused on compe-
tition, where the central bank’s main objective has been to introduce
contestability into all phases of payments, from provision of stored value
to clearing and settlement. The Reserve Bank of Australia explicitly aims
at establishing a regime in which nonbanks can have a role, hoping to
spur competition and improve payment efficiency. 
To open the provision of stored value to competition, reforms have
authorized a new specialist class of regulated institutions called “pur-
chased payment providers.” These firms can offer transaction services by
providing customers with stored-value products that can be used in a
wide variety of situations or be redeemed for Australian dollars. Reforms
have also opened payment clearing systems to nonbank competition by
creating regulated entities known as specialist credit card institutions.
These institutions can offer acquiring services or issue credit or PIN
debit payment cards. Access to the central bank’s settlement accounts is
also now open to nonbanks that provide third-party payment services in
need of settlement and can demonstrate that they can meet specified liq-
uidity needs. 
Lowe stressed that, in each of these reforms, the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia has addressed risks, through regulation and other means, to allow
nonbanks in the payments system without posing an excessive threat to
stability. He argued that it is better to allow nonbanks to provide payment
services where the risk is managed rather than exclude nonbanks alto-
gether. Moreover, the central bank’s comprehensive powers have been an
advantage because they allow explicit recognition and analysis of the
tradeoff between efficiency and risk in the payments system. 
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In his comments, Thomas M. Hoenig raised three questions on
how the role of central banks might evolve in light of recent changes in
retail payments. First, is the supervisory and regulatory structure for
nonbanks in payments adequate? More work needs to be done to assess
this framework, with initial efforts aimed at understanding the sources
of data breaches and the mechanisms by which the data are used for
fraudulent purposes. Nonbanks in payments require some special con-
sideration given their increased presence, concentration in certain
critical services, custody of vast amounts of sensitive payments data, and
limited or lack of direct oversight. 
Second, in the context of a changing risk profile of retail payments,
can incentives be aligned so that the industry can effectively self-regulate
and reduce any need for new regulation? Experience has shown that,
within certain boundaries and the right incentives, a market or an
industry can successfully self-regulate. 
Third, given central banks’ valuable experience in providing some
banking services, might they also participate in providing retail elec-
tronic payment services? The answer must consider a number of issues,
such as the value of creating a switch of last resort; accommodation of
credit and debit transactions; and the impacts on competition, innova-
tion, efficiency, and access. These are difficult issues but are worth
considering, especially before we are forced to face them in circum-
stances of crisis. 
The discussion period featured questions about regulation in pay-
ments. In 2001, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published
core principles for the design and operation of payments systems that
are applicable for all countries. Given the greater roles in the payments
system for nonbank payment processors, merchants, and corpora-
tions—and the more regional and global nature of payments
customers—would it make sense to review the principles to create a
more consistent supervisory framework for payments? Panelists
responded that the core principles were a good starting point for regula-
tion, but access to payments and interactions between payments systems
also needed to be considered. The BIS approach has the advantage of
being principles-based, which allows flexibility in a dynamic payments
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market and applies to both banks and nonbanks. Revising the core prin-
ciples would be a challenge. It may be more important at this time to
encourage international cooperation on payments issues. 
Acquiring payments for processing involves some credit risk, which
has traditionally been underwritten by banks. What is the best way to
regulate the acquiring business if it opens up to nonbank processors?
One method is to take a functional approach. Regardless of bank or
nonbank status, acquirers must be able to manage risk. Regulators can
set a minimum standard, with acquirers free to establish risk controls
that are above the standard. 
Many foreign countries are opening up the payment settlement system
to nonbanks and, in particular, to retailers. Should the United States also
move in this direction? Panelists responded by noting that in Europe retail-
ers have moved into banking and payments, but unsuccessfully—possibly
due to an insufficient business case. Canada’s Interac Association opened to
nonbanks with success. A key to their success was changing the governance
structure to include all participants—banks, credit unions, retailers, acquir-
ers, and payment processors. The U.S. tradition has been to separate
banking and commerce over concerns of conflicts of interest in granting
credit. If the United States does move toward granting more nonbank
access to payments, it will likely do so slowly. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Conference participants came away with a much clearer under-
standing of the implications for the payments system of an increased
prominence and visibility of nonbanks. The broad picture clearly shows
the importance of nonbanks at almost every stage in the payments
chain. The tremendous change in the payments arena is embodied in
many significant innovations introduced by both nonbanks and banks.
In most cases, innovations in payment services build on existing, tradi-
tional payment types; while in some other cases, they provide novel
solutions. Technological innovation has significantly altered the market
structure and competition in payments. Network effects, in particular,
have had a strong influence on the degree of vertical and horizontal inte-
gration in the industry. 
    ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2007 103
The rising importance of nonbanks and the multiple roles they play,
both at the front end and back end, have changed the traditional risk
profile of the payments chain. As a result, central banks around the world
must confront many questions: Should the rising presence of nonbanks
in payments alter central bank policies? Do banks and nonbanks poten-
tially require different regulatory approaches? What incentives are in
place for industry self-regulation? The absence of clear-cut answers to
these questions is reflected in the many different approaches central
banks have taken toward nonbanks in payments systems.
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